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Aimand Ahmad
Fiqh, Women and Human Rights:
Competing Methodologies
Introduction
The academic debate about human rights, women and Islam
that has developed in recent times reveals a plethora of voices,
opinions and proposed legal solutions to what has become a high-
ly controversial and emotive politico-legal issue in the Muslim
world. The controversial nature of the debate is particularly height-
ened in the field of international law where the compatibility of
Islamic law with UN-inspired iegal regimes is contested and de-
bated amid a backdrop of recent colonialism, Third Worid pover-
ty and an academic history of Orientalism.
Although this field of enquiry has received considerable atten-
tion, subtle and often pervasive omissions become apparent in
much of the literature-omissions that are particularly glaring
when interrogating monographs written by authors from diver-
gent legal, religious and educational backgrounds. Apart from the
influences of such external factors such as the role of the nation
state and post-colonial struggles, the omissions in the debate arise
frorn different methodological approaches in the field of human
rights as well as from divergent scholarly training in religious and
secular texts. The result of this heterogeneous foundational lega-
cy is methodological and ideological confusion. "Comparative"
studies, such as those undertaken by A.E. Mayer, tend to polarise
politico-legal issues and obsfucate others. The readers of such com-
parative studies tend to get the impression that for Islamic law to
be brought into harmony with the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights (UDHR)1 in relation to women's human rights, that
individual Muslims must choose the secular UDHR over shari'ah.2
1,23 Studia Islamika, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2003
Ajmand Ahmad
It is precisely this polarised message that has the effect of further
narrowing the debate and causing reactionary resPonses from
many Islamist3 groups. Shari'nh, in much of the literature is pre-
sented as being monolithic in nature (by both sides of the debate)
and as something that should therefore be jettisoned in order for
progress to be made within the field of human rights.
At the same time, many Muslim proponents of human rights
advocating a reformed approach, adopt the terminology of "con-
stitutionalism", "democracy" and "civil society" without locating
these terms precisely within an Islamic legal framework' The re-
sult of mixing this "Western" theoretical terminology with Islamic
concepts is to lay these Muslim human rights activists open to charg-
es of being "imitators" of "Western feminism and colonialism".a
The result of discordant and incoherent foundational approaches
in the legal debate is that, quite often, individual authors are ar-
ticulating their ideas in completely different (theoretical) languag-
es. The resulting cacophony of voices has the effect of creating a
polarisation in the debate about Islam, human rights and women.
What is required, rather, is a space within which multifarious voices
from the Islamic world can be heard. In particular, the various
attempts at critically engaging with and debating the historical,
sociological and legal aspects of shari'nh must be given priority if
any cogent and confident legal resPonse is to be formulated in the
area of human rights and Muslim women. At a deeper level how-
ever, after surveying the literature which critically engages with
shari'sh and usfiI alJiqh,s a theoretical vacuum needs to be filled
which coherently addresses the problem of legal methodology.
Without a foundational reconstruction of Islamic methodology,
the conceptual framework in this area of law reform will remain
fraught with confusion and misunderstanding.
This paper attempts to, firstly, examine in some depth various
writers' investigations into Islam, women and human rights. Sec-
ondly, and more importantly, it attemps provide a clear conceptu-
al framework within which to articulate a foundation for the sub-
ject in the future. Such a re-conceptualisation is necessary to an-
chor future attempts at Iaw reform within an Islamic jurispruden-
tial heritage. By re-locating the debate within the Islamic heri-
tage, any articulation of human rights and Muslim women will
have the authority of a fiqh-tnspired methodology. For Muslim
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women engaged in the struggle for human rights, such a strategy
will be more successful than either employing secular "Western"
feminist discourse or by claiming the right to interpret the origi-
nal Islamic sources whilst ignoring fiqh history, methodology and
terminology.
In order to more clearly examine, interrogate and, finally, ar-
ticulate these issues in greater depth, this paper proceeds in a num-
ber of sections. First, as a preliminary introduction, a brief outline
of the main sources of Islamic law and jurisprudence will be ad-
umbrated. Section I will critically examine some recent scholar-
ship in the field of Islamic law, women and human rights. The
authors chosen for this examination include both Muslim and non-
Muslim women. The nature of their divergent theoretical approach-
es will be discussed so as to uncover hidden biases, different con-
ceptual matrices utilised and foundational deficiencies inherent in
the respective approaches. Section II will outline two specific ex-
amples of writers locating their arguments for Islamic law reform
pertaining to women from within both Shia and Sunni fiqh tradi-
tions. The final section will then take the discussion to a broader
level of discussion by exploring the possibilities for re-articulating
an Islamic legal methodology. Modern attempts at reconstructing
such a methodology are numerous, but the writers selected here
(Rahman and Shahrur) have been chosen because of their compre-
hensive and coherent structural approach.
The aim of this paper is therefore to advocate a two-tiered ap-
proach in the academic study of Islam, human rights and women.
On one level, Muslim and non-Muslim women need to actively
and critically engage with the juristic heritage of ustrl al-fiqh. This
is necessary because of the requirement of authenticity and au-
thority for Muslims caught up in the process of legally and politi-
cally adjusting to, and debating with, modernity and a colonial
legacy of political dominance. Adopting the voice and reasoning
tools of fiqh sowrces will significantly reinforce the struggle for
human rights and law reform. Furthermore, such a strategy en-
sures protection from being labelled a "Western agent of imperi-
alism" by reactive elements within Islamist circles. On another level,
and at the same time. Muslim and non-Muslim writers must be
involved in reformulating the structure of Islamic legal methodol-
ogy so as to provide a coherent and logical foundation for their
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Iegal reforms. Such a re-conceptualisation of Islamic law is neces-
sary so as to avoid ad hoc and confusing reform programs articu-
lated by reformers such as Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida.6
The Sources of Islamic Law and |urisprudenceT
So as to provide a legal and historical background to the subse-
quent sections of this paper, a brief outline of the main sources of
Islamic law andfiqhwillbe presented here. First, the primary source
of Islamic law is the Qur'An. It is a record of the verbal revelation
vouchsafed to the Prophet Muhammad during a period of about
twenty-two years at Mecca (610-622 AD) and Medina (622-632).8
The Qur'An is therefore regarded as being "the sum total of God's
revelations to the Prophet"e and hence utterly sacred in content
and form for the vast majority of Muslims. It is also a religious
and historical document in which all possible legal issues are not
dealt with comprehensively or consistently. Out of necessity there-
fore, the Qur'An needed to be supplemented with other sources
for the purposes of building the foundations of legal theory. The
second major source of Islamic law is Sunnahl\ or "practice /tradi-
tion" of the Prophet and his Companions which provided a great
deal of textual material for the development of legal theories and
juristic tools during the first century of Islam. The basis of the
Sunnah are the stories that relate to the behaviour of the Prophet
and his Companions. The Ahilffithll were recited and recorded both
orally and textually and the textual collections form the basis of
the Sunnah.
Whereas the Qur'An and Sunnah are the sources from whichls-
lamic law is derived, the sources through which the Iaw may be
derived represent either methods of legal reasoning and interpre-
tation or the sanctioning instrument, oI ijmh' or consensus (HaI-
laq, 1.997: 7) Ijmk'|2 is a sanctioning instrument whereby the mujta-
hidsl3 representing the community at large, were considered to
have reached unanimous agreement on a technical legal ruling.
The fourth source of law subsumed under the rubric of ijmA' is
qiyfrsla or analogical reasoning. Qiyhs became tied to the twin doc-
trine of taqltdls, which represented the unquestioning acceptance
of the doctrines of established legal schools and authorities. This
development represents the famous "closing of the gates of ijti-
hhd" by jurists in the tenth century.l6 Less important methods of
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legal reasoning were based on considerations of juristic prefer-
ence (istihskn)\7 or public welfare and interest (istidkh).18 From this
brief outline of Islamic legal sources and juristic tools, the paper
will now focus upon two examples of how modern authors have
used and represented this legal heritage in the area of human rights.
A.E Mayer and Sisters in Islam:
Are We Speaking the Same Language?
The aim of this section is to critically examine the academic
efforts of a number of Muslim and non-Muslim writers in the field
of human rights, Islam and women. More precisely, this section of
the paper will demonstrate how a lack of a coherent and consis-
tent legal methodology prevents such scholarship from articulat-
ing a response that is intellectually sound and capable of reaching
a wide cross-section of readers. Often writers do not seem to be
even speaking in the same language. This "language" is one that
encompasses issues such as interpretative frameworks, Oriental-
ism, the educational backgrounds of various writers and, most
importantly, the issue of legal methodology. When such interpre-
tative "fiIters" are not used uniformly, or are not even acknowl-
edged, then the debate is one that becomes fraught with method-
ological confusion. It is precisely this problem of speaking differ-
ent methodological languages that will be examined bv interro-
gating the work of Ann E. Mayer and the Malaysian Muslim Wom-
en's group, Sisters in Islam (SIS).
A.E Mayer
Ann E. Mayor's book, "Islnm nnd Human Rights: Tradition and
Politics"(1.995) is a comparative survey of international human rights
standards as expressed in the UDHR and the US Constitution,
and various human rights schemes articulated in, for example, the
Iranian Constitution (1980)1e and by Islamists such as Mawdudi20
and Tabandeh.2l In the preface to her book, Mayer sets forth the
parameters of her approach to this comparative analysis by hedg-
ing her thesis with the rather trite statement: "[t]he Islamic sourc-
es and the core doctrines of Islam as a religious faith are not being
subjected to critical assessment in this study"(Mayer, 1995). Rath-
er, according to Mayer, her book points to the "imprecise legal
methodologies" and "misleading terminology" of the Islamist hu-
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man dghts schemes'proponents.22 To this end, Mayer sets about
presenting a dual structure to facilitate her argument. The Table
of Contents follows a simple counterpoint: "lequality in the Islam-
ic Legal Tradition" is immediately followed by "[e]qual protec-
tion in U.S. and Internationallaw"; "the contribution of Western
civilisation" is set forth in contradistinction to "the role of Islamic
law" and "the premodern Islamic heritage".23
Before embarking upon this bifurcated approach to her argu-
ment however, Mayer addresses the issue of Orientalism and its
use by many Western scholars to discredit any comparative study
of Islam and International law.2a Although she makes it clear that
her intention is not to display Islam in a pejorative manner by
comparing it to international rights standards, Mayer seems to
misunderstand Said's thesis. Orientalism,2s according to Said, is
not about preventing further scholarship from taking place be-
tween the "Orient" and the "Occident". What Said is asking schol-
ars to be aware of is the process of representstion that is employed
by writers which tends to posit an epistemological distinction be-
tween the Orient and the "West". Such a process of representa-
tion leads to a method for dominating, restructuring and having
authority over the Orient.26 In this sense, Orientalist approaches
serve to contrast and generate knowledge about "Islam" from a
position of relative power. It is precisely the process of represen-
tation (the comparative lens) in Mayer's work that has the effect
of entrenching a polarised and truncated view of Islam and hu-
man rights, which is neither helpful nor relevant for Muslim wom-
en.
At the same time Mayer's work is laudable in that she attempts
to uncover the political-and quite often reactive, motives of Islam-
ists such as Mawdudi. In particular, Mayers close analysis writers,
such as Tabandeh, uncovers the issue of sex-stereotyping that in-
forms the premises of many Islamist human rights regimes (May-
er, 1,995:98). For example, the focus upon the "essential" differ-
ences between males and females which warrants different stan-
dards of human rights protections, is a central feature of Mawdu-
di, Tabandeh and Ayatollah Banohar.2T Each states, with varying
levels of candour, that women are "by nature", more emotional
than men, more suited to housework and motherhood, lacking in
strong willpower and, owing to their physical "weakness", are
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not as mentally proficient as men (Mayer, 7995:98-1.07). After de-
tailing these hidden and manifest assumptions and stating that
under the Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW), countries are obliged to "frghl" sex stereoq?-
ing, Mayer concludes that patriarchal, traditional cultures influ-
ence the creation of such (erroneous ) assumptions that belittle
and devalue women's human rights (Mayer, 1,995:727).
However much this may be true, the deficiency in Mayer's anal-
ysis is that she fails to present a legitimate means of rectifying the
situation. instead of approaching the issue of Islamists' assumP-
tions from within the Islamic tradition, Mayor's analysis ends on a
note that simply asks whether or not the Islamic sources actually
support a patriarchal assumption of women's inferiority (Mayer,
1995; 722). By delimiting her book to one that approaches the top-
ic within a narrow, almost simplistic framework, Mayer prevents
her own analysis from operating at a higher theoretical level. As
will be detailed in Section II, despite Mayer's supposed academic
credentials as an authority on Islamic history and law (Mayer, 1995:
211), she does not venture into the realm of Islamic jurisprudence
which addresses the issue of a woman's legal, physical and mental
capacities. In various places in her book, Mayer cursorily men-
tions the history of Islamic law, but only to emphasise its complex,
diverse and heterogeneous nature and the fact that Muslims do
not agree on one precise formulation of what the law should be
(Mayer, 7995: 9). The conclusion Mayer draws from this is that
Muslims, in order to overcome their legal confusion, should aban-
don their search for Islamic responses to human rights and adopt
the legal panacea of the UDHR.'z8
Mayer rightly points out that Islamist regimes take a highty
selective approach when formulating their Islamic-based rights
schemes. However, Mayer fails to show precisely how and where
Islamists do not recognise or gloss over, the various and conflict-
ing jurisprudential material on the issue of women and human
rights. Her comparative legal approach has the effect of not ade-
quately providing iegal models or methodological answers to the
problem of Islam, women and human rights. Rather, Mayor's own
methodology is exposed as being woefully inadequate for the task.
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Sisters in lslam (SIS)2'
This section of the chapter will present an examination and dis-
cussion of two Muslim women and their attempt to critically en-
gage with the legal heritage of shari'ah in an effort to articulate a
framework for women's human rights.3o Both papers are illumi-
nating for the conceptual frameworks they choose to use, for the
particular use of terminology such as "citizenship" and "constitu-
tionalism", and for the method by which each author attempts to
use language of justice and ethics from the original sources of Is-
lamic law.
First, in Zainah Anwar's paper, the right to re-read and inde-
pendently understand the sources of Islamic law is clairned along
with the right to use the theoretical and practical terminology of
the modern nation-state. Anwar explicitly addresses the "givens"
of modern Malaysia: the fact that Malaysia has a constitution, that
it claims to be democratic and the fact that it is multi-ethnic and
multi religious (Anwar, 7998: 2-3).
This use of terminology is significant for a number of reasons.
It attests to the fact of cultural and socio-legal hybridity that ex-
ists within Malaysia.3l It is practical proof of the changing flux in
the debate about human rights in Islam in terms of the conceptual
armoury used to discuss the nature of law and rights by Muslim
authors. This change is particularly revelatory in terms of the ap-
parent contradictions that appear in Anwar's analysis.32
Second, like Mayer, Anwar discusses particular aspects of the
recent changes to the Islamic Family Laws in relation to the Con-
vention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women.
Where Anwar's examination of the international human rights re-
gime differs from Mayer, is in the two-pronged theoretical dis-
cussion she undertakes simultaneously. First, she emphatically and
clearly invokes the iegal and moral authority of the Malaysian
Constitution in stating and protecting the rights of women. Sec-
ond, the subsequent reservations the government pJaced upon
various articles of CEDAW 
-without reference to democratic pro-cesses-is criticised by Anwar as an example of the antidemocrat-
ic nature of consulting an obscure group of (unelected) Islamic
scholars (Anwar, 7995:77). Anwar labels these reservations as "un-
lslamic", but does not elaborate any further. Rather, the focus of
her criticism of recent government policies adopts the rhetoric of
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an egalitarian Qur'Anic ethic conjoined with an apPeal to the Iegal
and moral ideals enunciated in the Federal Constitution. For An-
war, there is no contradiction between democracy, civil liberties,
constitutionalism and an Islamic value system. Moreover, Anwar
views the adoption of laws which have not been passed through
democratic processes as being clearly un-lslamic. One example she
uses to demonstrate this antidemocratic tendency, is that of the
position of the state muffr, whose fatwhs have been given automat-
ic legal sanction without going through a democratic legislative
process. By disregarding democratic machinery, Anwar sees the
role of the state and the religious scholars as "tantamount to rule
by decree of a theocratic dictatorship" (Anwar, 1'998: 77). More-
over, Anwar points out, fatwhs never had the automatic force of
law in Islamic history and it was not a crime for people to disre-
gard a fatwk as it was seen as being simply an advisory opinion(Anwar, 7998: 1,7-78).33
In addition to viewing the issuing of legally binding fatwhs as
anti-democratic and un-Islamic, Anwar is more concerned about
how a few religious scholars could have had their personal legal
opinions passed by all relevant arms of government without any
public consultation, debate or discussion. In particular, Anwar
points out that the very nature of a mujtahld's opinion, and the
process of exercising ijtihkd, necessarily involves differences of
opinion. The implication of having legitimate differences of opin-
ion in a legal milieu is that a nation-state, claiming to be democrat-
ic, must publicly debate and thoroughly discuss all the implica-
tions of a law before it can be accepted by ifs citizens. This co-
option of the vocabulary of individual rights ais-a-uis the state,
the use of democratic terminology and the appeal to the constitu-
tion, reveals the accretion and cross-fertilisation of legal and po-
litical thought in the intellectual heritage of a modern, practising
Muslim. In particular, the fact that Anwar appeals to the constitu-
tion reveals the theoretical and ethical parallel and compatibility
she (implicitly) makes between the instrumental legitimacy of the
constitution and the egalitarian ethic of Islam as a worldview' In
addition, Anwar refers to the multi-ethnic and multi-racial char-
acter of Malaysia, the push for economic ascendancy, and the pace
of social change as a result of government policies designed to
promote such modernisation (Anwar, 1998: 79). Linked to all of
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these socio-economic changes, is the Malaysia itself, where reli-
gious leaders at the state level constantly undermine the federal
government's attempts at providing coherent legal reform (An-
war,1,998'. 21,-22).
Yet again, this discussion reveals Anwar's implicit and explicit
acceptance of the modern forms of governance, the various ways
of dividing political power within the state, and the reality of eco-
nomic change, which demands the education and employment of
women. Here, one cannot find an analysis of the world and it's
ills as filtered through the lens of dkr al-Islfrm and dkr al-harb.3a The
theoretical and methodological responses Anwar makes to the is-
sue of human rights and Muslim women in Malaysia contain the
hybridised language of modern forms of political language with a
very different perspective on Qur'dnic justice and legal norms than
the usual (male) Islamist response.
Anwar makes an attempt to reformulate the methodological
framework for human rights and Muslim women by privileging the
principles of 'Justice, equality, freedom and virtue" (Anwar, 1998)3s
as the Qur'Anic benchmarks for interpreting and reforming the law.
At the same time, Anwar side-steps the issue of the history of usttl
al-fiqh, by emphasising and claiming the right to ijtihkd over and
above the other juristic devices present in Islamic jurisprudence.
This is an important and interesting distinction because it highlights
the crux of the theoretical debate about legal methodologie(s) in
the Muslim world. At one level, it serves to point to the inherent
problem of reformulating the political philosophy of Islam. For ex-
ample, the reliance upon notions of "public welfare" (istislAD in for-
mulating legal opinions and translating them into law, was, in the
classical era of the Islamic empire, a juristic device used by political
and legal authorities as a valid basis on which to pass laws. Along
with the devices if ijmh', qiyks, the doctrine of taqhd and the complex
system of hiyal,Islamic jurisprudence became intricately connected
to the prevailing political authority in power in a way that was to
preclude the complete development of a strong and independent
judiciary-so necessary for the control and accountability of the
Westphalian template of modern nation-states (Coulson, 1985:210-
213).By reclaiming the method of legal reasoning as embodied in
the hadtth of the Prophet, Anwar does away with the need for in-
vestigating the usttl al-fiqh. This is problematic in that Anwar's at-
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tempt does not systematlcally deal with the hierarchy of juristic
devices in the classical legal doctrines in which iiilhAd became en-
meshed in a dialectical relationship with iim|' and qiyks. To this ex-
tent, Anwar's analysis shares theoretical and structural weaknesses
with Mayer's work. Instead, Anwar chooses to use the language of
democracy conjoined with Islamic terminology:
... Today's women will not be cowed into silence anymore. They are
more convinced than ever that it was not Allah's intention to keep them
submissive, inferior, silent just because they are women. It is this convic-
tion in an Islam that is just that gives us the courage to stand up to reclaim
our religion and to claim for ourselves the demouatic space to speak out
against ail kinds of injustic (Anwar, 1998:29, emphases added).
It is this recurring motif of "democratic space/' which lies be-
neath Anwar's attempt to articulate a view from within the Islam-
ic heritage about the role of the 'ulnmk'36 in interpreting the body
of Islamic law. Anwar does not deny the right of the 'ulamh' to
undertake their role in juristic interpretation. She does, however,
question any attempt of an individual or unelected minority of
people to claim a monopoly over the act of interpretation (Anwar,
7998: 26). Anwar views any claim of universality in monolithic
terms as inherently unjust and lacking the Weltnnschauung of the
Qur'An-the ethos of justice and egalitarianism. Rather, she states,
the "experience of others who have been traditionally excluded
from the process of interpreting, defining and implementing Is-
lam must be included" (Anwar, 1'998:27).
Amina Wadud dissects the themes included in Anwar's paPer
with greater clarity. Specifically, Wadud examines the Qur'Anic
notion of Khalifat (vicegerency) as it relates to citizenship and gen-
der in civil society.3T In particular, Wadud draws a distinction be-
tween moral society and civil society: the former can only be de-
veloped at the individual level through the exercise of moral agen-
cy. This (initiatly) internal source of a moral society necessarily
precludes the use of force. As Wadud emphatically states, "you
cannot legislate a person into a state of moral excellence".3s There-
fore, even when the goal of an Islamic civil society is to establish a
moral order, there is, according to Wadud, a functional disparity
between the intent and the fulfilment of that intent.3e This is be-
cause the development of the moral agent in the context of a mor-
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al society cannot be achieved through external means. At the same
time, however, Wadud argues that civil society has a crucial role
to play in fostering the fulfilment of the moral agent within a moral
society. This role is an instrumental one which involves providing
a system of checks and balances within a society that demarcates
and allocates loci of (temporal) power.
But in what way exactly does moral society require civil soci-
ety and how does this relate to agency and gender? First, accord-
ing to Wadud, an "Islamic" society goes through an almost teleo-
logical process of deciding what is ma'rfif and munkar.aO In order to
facilitate this process, various mechanisms were formulated dur-
ing the classical era of Islamic history (ijmk',qiyks etc.). As the pro-
cess of deciding the best path for a moral society is an unfolding
one, there is, argues Wadud, always a distinction between human
implementation of the divine will and the divine will itself (Wadud,
7998:77). To illustrate this point, Wadud gives the example of the
Indonesian and Malaysian qkds and their respective "rulings" on
the role of Muslim women as judges. In the former, women are
considered quite legitimate representatives of the courts, where-
as in the latter, the qfrds have decided that women are not fit to
fulfil all the obligations of a qAd (Wadud, 7998:73). Wadud's point
here is deceptively simple but always dismissed as irrelevant by
some Islamists: that there has always been and always is a dis-
junction between the human, still-evolving part of interpreting the
law, and the ideal of moral society as enunciated in the Qur'An.
Keeping this important distinction in mind, it becomes clearer
how Wadud's moral-civil paradigm relates to the issue of agency
and gender in Islam. If women are not considered to be full moral
agents by the society they live in, then the result of this truncation
of vicegerency ,through the human inspired law, is the nullifica-
tion of the Qur'Anic vision for moral society (Wadud, 1,998: 1,2).
This vision includes the many verses relating to taqwfr, which is
the chief end of moral society in the Islamic milieu, the attainment
of which is not fettered by gender-based restrictions (Wadud, 1998:
22-3). The implications of this mode of reasoning is that women
are deemed to be full moral agents who must avail themselves of
all means in civil society engage in law reform (Wadud, 1,998:26-
27). The rationale for law reform being that it is part of the pro-
cess of creating a moral society:
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[Y]ou cannot construct laws that legislate the lives of. full moral agents
without the participation of the agents themselves in tl.e process of legisla-
tion (Wadud,7998:27).
It is important to point out at this stage that Wadud does not do
away with the need for shqri'qh. Rather, she regards the corpus of
juristic methods, rulings and fiqh as a central instrument in provid-
ing the individual moral agent with a historically-based means by
which to survey and assess the creation of a moral society (Wadud,
7998:29). However, the fact that the shqfi'ah evolved with only the
input of male moral agents is significant in formulatingshari'ahnow.
By interrogating the shai'ah of the classical era, the texts reveal how
made jurists addressed women as objects of the law rather than fuIl
moral agents (Wadud, 7998: 24; see also Wadud, 1994). By con-
structing the law through an androcentric lens, the male jurists have
granted Muslim women an insufficient status, which prevents her
from completing her khilhfah before Allah-khilhfah being the ulti-
mate purpose of her humanity. Resisting the unfair legal treatment
of women becomes, for Wadud, part of an individual's moral duty.
By using the theoretical vehicle of khilkt'ah, Wadud is able to
negotiate the difficult territory of shart'ah, political power and
human rights without totally jettisoning the heritage of shafi'ah,
fiqh and an Islamic cosmology based on the creation of a moral
order on earth. Rather than positing a crude either/or dichotomy
between secular "modernity" and twelfth century shari'ah under-
neath the rubric of state power, Wadud manages to articulate a
(partiaily) viable Islamic solution to the theoretical debate on wom-
en and human rights. Yet, as will be demonstrated in Sections II
and III, even this attempt must be reinforced with a clear Islamic-
based methodology if it is to remain a consistently viable position
on Muslim women's legal rights.
Relocating the Debate within UsfiI al-Fiqh
The preceding section has demonstrated the various omissions
and deficiencies in the academic literature on Islam, human rights
and women. The aim of this section is to provide two examples of
recent scholarship that address the problem from within the per-
spective of fiqh.al Both articles demonstrate that the struggle for
Islamic law reform would greatly profit from exploiting problems
and tensions that have been recognised to exist within Islamic law.
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Ziba Mir-Hosseini and Zanan Magazine
At the outset of her article Mir-Hosseini asks to what extent
and by what means can limitations imposed on women by shari'ah
texts be re-negotiated? To this question Mir-Hosseini's reply is
affirmative only if Islam no longer remains part of an oppositional
discourse which makes any scholarship conducted in this area both
apologetic and reactionary.a2 Now that official discourse in Iran is
no longer geared toward opposing the Shah's legal regime, the
national debate on legal reform situates itself within Shia jurispru-
dence.a3 This shift in the parameters of the debate is significant in
that the custodians of the shari'sh are in power and so must justify
any discriminatory laws on the basis of the sarne shart'ah. This
process of justification is gradually revealing the hidden biases
embedded in the t'iqh that cannot be attributed to the spirit of the
Qur'An.
The results of the change in the foundations of the discourse
have resulted in some startling and provocative re-readings of
Islamic primary and secondary sources of jurisprudence by both
female and male religious scholars. Perhaps the most surprising
aspect of Mir-Hosseini's article is that the most incisive and confi-
dent legal arguments in favour of women have come from a male
religious scholar using a female pseudonym in a women's maga-
zine! What is remarkable about this male legal response is that it
tackles the patriarchal interpretations of the shari'ah by Mortaza
Motahhari,a Ali Shari'atias and medieval jurists from within the
fiqh tradition by employing traditional tools of interpretation.
The debate centres upon the introduction of the new Family
Protection Law (FPL) in December 1.992 (entitled "Amendments
to Divorce Law"1.+a The new legal regime outlaws registration of
all divorces without a court certificate. It also requires all divorc-
ing couples to go through a process of arbitration and allows for
the appointment of women judges as advisers to the primary judge
hearing the case. Most radical of all, the Amendment allows the
court to place a monetary value on a woman's housework and
entitles her to ujrat al-mithl ("wages in kind") for all housework
done throughout her marriage.aT The law, however, only passed
the Council of Guardians and the Majlis after much debate over
its provisions, particularly the provision relating to ujrat al-mithl.
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The significance of the new divorce law and the debate sur-
rounding it underscores the fact that the present debates are tak-
ing place in the Islamic Republic, whose claim to uphold and en-
f.orce shari'ah makes it directly responsible for any injustices that
take place under the legal regime (Hosseini, 7996: 292).It is within
this context that the women's magazine Zanan opens up the de-
bate in a series of articles focusing upon "Law/Rights" as they
pertain to gender inequality (Hosseini, 1.996: 292). Zanan 4 in par-
ticular displays a very marked shift in tone and style. This change
is because the author, with the female pseudonym of "Mina Yade-
gar Azadi" takes issue with the premises of the Shia discottrse on
the position of women by using the juristic and logical argumenta-
tive devices of usitl alJiqh (Hosseini, 1.996:297). The first article by
Azadi deals with the issue of forbidding women, since 1.979 to
serve as judges on the grounds that it is against the rules of shari'ah
to do so (Hosseini, 7996:297). Azadi systematically deals with
each reason behind the legal proScription. First, Azadi looks at
the Qur'Anic verses used to support the prohibition, namely,4:34
(al-NisA'), 2: 228 (al-BaqArah) and 59: 33 (al-Ahzab) (Hosseini, 7996:
297). To the orthodox interpretation of the first verse which many
Islamists claim prohibits women from having dominion over men/
Azadi counters the view by arguing that the verse does not indi-
cate that men are superior to women. Rather, the verse merely
recalls the place of married men within the family that corresponds
to economic conditions.
More specifically, Azadi employs an etymological analysis of
two words within the verse which have been interpreted by men
to justify men's natural and institutional superiority over women.
These words are fadl ("to excel"), and qawwkm ("to maintain")
(Hosseini, 7996: 296). Using his knowledge of Arabic linguistics,
Azadi explains that faal, rather than denoting a natural or founda-
tional advantage, actually indicates a level of advantage or supe-
riority that is achieaed. He does this linguistic deconstruction by
distinguishing three nuances of the term. Fad\, Azadi explains, has
both negative and positive connotations. In the positive sense (fadl
i-mamdfih), it can mean a) fafl by variety, such as the superiority of
animal over plant life; or b) fafl by species, such as the superiority
of humans over other mammals; and c) fsdby essence (dhht), such
as the advantage of one person over another which is commonly
Studis Islamika, VoI. 10, No. 1,2003
138 Ajmand Ahmad
measured by some criteria such as wealth or education (Hosseini,
1996:296). Viewing the verse in the light of the last connotation of
fadl, Azadi concludes that men's fafl in relation to women only
arises in the event of his having to manage and provide for his
own family (Hosseini, 1996:298).
The same etymological distinction is drawn when dissecting
the meaning of the word qawrnkm, which denotes a contract or a
custom that men voluntarily undertake to run the affairs of a fam-
ily (Hosseini,7996:297). Rather than implying superiority, the two
words indicate that men's right to maintain their families is tied
to economic imperatives and duties. If, for example, the economic
roles were to be reversed, then a wife would have an achieaed
right of making decisions for the management of the family if she
so fulfilled tlne duty o/ responsibly providing for her family
(Hosseini, 7996: 298).
Azaditreats the remaining two verses in a similar manner. With
regard to verse 228 of al-BaqArah which is taken to mean that men
are a degree higher in status than women, Azadi argues that the
difference in rights and duties, which is both relative and a matter
of convention, cannot justify men's "irtnate" superiority 
-both
are equal on account of their humanity (Hosseini, 1.996: 298). To
counter the argument based on verse 33 of al-AhzAb, which is used
to justify restricting women to the home, Azadi offers a number
of responses. First, he points out that the preceding verse reveals
that it was addressed to the wives of the Prophet and therefore
not applicable to any other women. Second, assuming that it was
addressed to all women, its command (hukm) is guiding (irshhdi)
in nature, not binding (ilzhmi). This latter point is agreed upon by
all jurists who have not decreed that God's command in the verse
be taken as an obligatory that women should be confined to their
houses (Hosseini, 7996: 298). The conclusion Azadi draws from
the examination of all three verses is that women are in no way
debarred from serving as judges. Aty other conclusion is but a
pretext for those in political power to keep Muslim women sec-
ond class citizens (Hosseini, 1.996:298).
It is in the next issue of Zannn (June/July 1'992) that Azadi fo-
cuses on the relationship between ijmh' and ijtihkd. He begins by
defining the nature, scope and function of ijmk' in Shis fiqh and its
relationship with ijilhAd. The thrust of his argument is that ijmh'
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involves the gathering of opinions of scholars and jurists on a par-
ticular issue and is therefore merely a tool for denying a law from
the primary sources 
-it is not a source of law on its own (Hosseini,1.996:299). Since there is no requirement as to the minimum num-
ber of these opinions, it has become customary to claim that ijmh'
has been achieved for some legal rulings whose principles do not
necessarily correspond to those as embodied in the primary sources
(Hosseini, 1996: 300). Furthermore, Azadi elaborates that there
are two kinds of ijmh' . The first, ijmk' -i- muhassil (obtained con-
sensus), is obtained through the collection of all the jurists on a
particular issue. The second, ijmf i-manqLl (narrated ijmh' ), is
formed when a fnqth of mujtahid, in order to support his own oprn-
ion, makes a claim of other jurist's consensus without conducting
thorough research (Hosseini, 7996:300). As the first type of ijmk'
is virtually impossible to achieve, according to Azadi, the jurists
of today are referring to the second type. As such, the function of
the second type of ijmh' is to affirm the Sunnnh. The second type
of ijmfr' therefore has little legitimacy on its own 
-otherwise thejurists'opinion could replace the primary sources (the Qur'An and
the Sunnah) (Hosseini, 7996:300). With regard to women's capac-
ity to be judges, there is no ijmh' -i-muhassil preventing women
from holding such positions. Of the ijmk' -i-manqAl, Azadi qwes-
tions the gender assumptions of the various male jurists who claim
that women are naturally inferior to men. He clearly points out
that cenfuries of confinement to the home has led men to believe
that women are incapable of holding public office (Hoss eini, 1996:
300).
In the final issue of Zanan, where Azadi attacks the orthodox
approach of viewing the law as it pertains to women, he draws a
clearer distinction between the primary sources of law and sec-
ondary jurisprudential (fiqh texts). He emphatically points out that
the primary sources do not contain any evidence which would
warrant the secondary sources banning women from working, is-
suing decrees or becoming a religious leaders. Rather, he points
out that the secondary sources reflect the views and biases of his-
torical Muslim scholars and jurists rather than the original texts.
He calls for all fiqh opinions to be reassessed in the light of the
principles and ethical postulates presented in the Qur'An.a8 Azadi
concludes his arguments in Zanan by calling for complete gender
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equality in all spheres of shari'nhby presenting a shari'ah bill of
rights for women. This is done by elaborating six principles en-
tailing equal rights in 1) education, 2) choosing a profession, 3)
administering justice, 4) attaining spiritual perfection, 5) being the
recipients of equal rewards and punishments and lastly, 5) devel-
oping a healthy society and fulfilling other social and human needs
(Hosseini, 1996: 303).
The implications that emerge from this examination of Azadi's
contribution to the debate are significant in terms of constructing
an incisive and authoritative approach and methodology for law
reform in the area of Islam, human rights and women. As Mir-
Hosseini points out, by taking a fiqh approach it is possible to,
firstly, survey the divergent opinions and rulings of jurists and
judges. Then the issue can be put into historical perspective and
evaluated in the light of the Qur'An, ahhdtth, ijmk' , reason as well
as the local practices of that time. Finally, those opinions which
are contrary to the writers' position can be refuted by using juris-
tic devices. Among the various fiqh-based arguments included are
the distinction made between the Divine Lawgiver and the tem-
poral law maker (the Islamic Republic), and between primary and
secondary sources of the shafi'cth. While primary sources are sub-
jected to innovative methods of interpretation, the secondary sourc-
es are actively debated and at times refuted by the aid of the
former. Mir-Hosseini and Zanan authors argue that history and
politics are the decisive factors which moulded the specific juristic
rules governing women. Of these rules, some are binding (ilzkmi)
and others are guiding (irshAdD. Moreover, writers such as Azadi
support a radical use of ijilhAd in order to rectify the gender dis-
crimination present in the legal system. By using this wide spec-
trum of reasoning, juristic tools and linguistic critique, Zansn wrlt-
ers are prising open the fissures in the legal heritage of shari'ahso
as to reform the law from the authoritative voice of a fiqh back-
ground. Although somewhat unstructured in their approach, the
Zanan debates are an example of the beginning of a new and more
effective strategy in the struggle for Muslim women/s human right
(Hosseini, 1996: 375).
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Muhammad Fadel and the Law of Female Testimony
Muhammad Fadel explicitly takes a fiqh approach to this con-
troversial area of the shnri'ah by pointing out that jurisprudence by
its very nature takes a broader interpretative perspectle. i adtth
collection or exegesis (tafstr) on the other hand adopts a more ato-
mistic approach and allows for a greater risk of an androcentric
interpretation of the legal sources.ae Fadel then introduces the best-
known example of discrimination against women in Islamic law:
the relative weight given to women's testimony as witnesses in
comparison to mens'. The discrimination that is evident in this
area of the law arises from the following Qur'Anic verse:
O believers, when you contract a debt one upon another for a stated
term, write it down ... and call in to witness two witnesses, men; or, if they
not be men, then one man and two women, such witnesses as you approve
of, lest one of the two [women] err, then the other will remind her.so
Many jurists, as proof that women are more prone to error
than men, have attributed the possibility of error to women. The
twelfth century theologian Fakhr al-Din al-RAzi explained the in-
ferior status of women's testimony as emanating from her "na-
ture" which made her more likely to forget than a man (Fadel,
7997: 1.86). This view has resonances in the twentieth century in
the comments of Sayyid Qutb where he argued that a woman/s
psychology and motherly instincts prevent her from possessing
the objectivity for being a single witness (Fadel, 1997: 786). The
Egyptian reformer Muhammad Abduh was the first twentieth cen-
tury scholar to provide a different explanation by pointing out
that the different economic roles of men and women in society
made each likely to forget those things which were not part of his
or her daily experience (Fadel,1.997:186). According to reformers
like Abduh, the apparent rule established by the verse was nei-
ther universally applicable across time nor generally applicable to
all types of cases brought to court (Fadel, 7997:1,86).
Despite the foundational premise established in ihis area of the
law that discriminated against women's testimony, a careful ex-
amination of the historical and legal medieval legacy reveals two
interrelated themes that could serve to provide a powerful argu-
ment for fiqh-based law reform. One issue is that medieval jurists
accepted or rejected testimonies based on criteria pertaining to
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social status, religion and whether the witness was a slave or a
free person. Because the arena of the court was iaden with parti-
san interests, the judge made a distinction between normative
speech and political discourse when assessing the credibility of
witnesses (Fadel, 1997: 787). Fadel defines political discourse as
statements which, if admitted in the courtroom, would lead to
some immediate, tangible consequence in favour of one party and
against the other (Fadel, 7997: 1.88). Therefore a witnesses' testi-
mony and a judge's verdict are both political because of the conse-
quences of either are immediate irrespective of the consent of the
party who contests either the facts presented by the witnesses or
the rule of law applied by the judge (Fadel, 7997:7BB).In contrast,
normative discourse, if admitted establishes a universal norm or
fact, but only potentially affects tangible interests of the Iitigants
(Fadel, 1997: 1.BB). The manner in which Islamic law treated both
forms of course was divergent. More precisely, a disputed fact in
a lawsuit, could generaliy be established by the testimony (shahhdah)
of two men (Fadel, 7997: 188). However, the normative statements
used by an independent interpreter of the law (mujtahid) as a source
for the derivation of the law only needed the narration of one
person. In other words, the narration of normative statements was
gender neutral. For example, Fatimah and 'Aishah's narration of a
hadith would be as probative as 'AIi's so long as all narrators were
credible.sl
Furthermore, the process by which legal norms were derived
from the Prophetic reports were also considered to lie in the nor-
mative realm of discourse, and was therefore gender-neutral. This
logically extended to interpretation of revelation. Hence, the opin-
ion (fatwk) of a woman in law was just as valid and legitimate as
that of man (Fadel, 1.997: 190). A woman could theoretically be a
muftt and a legal expert. The reason behind the gendered nature
of a woman's courtroom testimony therefore has reasons other than
those rooted in epistemological differences in character or "na-
ture". The reason that emerges from the historical and legal liter-
ature is one that centres on the differing modes of regulating trans-
mission and testimony (Fadel, 7997: 190). For if a woman's rea-
soning powers were deemed so deficient that her recollection of
facts were not to be trusted, then courts would have rejected her
interpretations of revelation as also being defective and therefore
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inadmissible. Apart from considering a woman/s'legal opinion as
sound as any mans', women actuaily participated in the produc-
tion and reproduction of the theoretical sciences as well as in
branches of speculative legal philosophy (Fadel, 1997:790-1).The
fact that women were recognised as equal participants in intellec-
tual fields of study and inquiry including law, created an aware-
ness of the fundamental contradiction between this participation,
and women's marginalised position as political actors in a court of
Iaw (Fadel, 7997: 790-1.). More importantly, it served to prevent
arguments about the discriminatory political rules of women/s tes-
timony being grounded in epistemological, essentialised terms
(Fadel, 7997 : 1.90-1.).
What is unearthed from Fadel's historical examination are a
number of medieval jurists who locate the source of this testimo-
nial discrimination in specific social circumstances that women find
themselves in. in addition, certain jurists identify and admit the
reasons so uncovered point to a contradiction in the law. First, the
fifteenth century Syrian Hanafi jurist al-TarAbuhisi admits that the
truth-value of testimony is not Iinked to the gender of the speaker
(Fadel, 1.997: 793). However, he then hedges and expands his ar-
gument by stating that women are required to stay at home so as
to preventf tnah from disturbing the social fabric of society (Fadel,
1997: 742-3).s2 Therefore, so as to discourage the use of female
witnesses (in a public arena) the law governing testimony discrim-
inated against women. By so doing, the law was encouraging the
use of male witnesses in civil transactions, thereby reducing the
need for women to leave their homes (Fadel, 7997:742-3). Rather
than locate the source of the discrimination in a woman's nature,
al-TarAbul0si justifies the rules on the basis of social costs of treat-
ing a woman's testimony as that of a man's. The argument then, is
political as it is balancing compeiing interests of society and indi-
viduals. Thus on a legal basis Muslim jurists had to admit that
from within the criteria of jurisprudential reasoning, discrimina-
tion against women on the basis of intellectual or psychological
inferiority of women, was an untenable position (Fadel, L997 794).
A second tension in the fiqh history offers an even stronger
argument for modern law reformers in their struggle to rectify
gender-based discrimination in this area of the law. The domi-
nant juridical discourse was premised upon the distinction between
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a normative realm and a political realm of discourse. The Particu-
lar interests involved in the political realm involved a higher de-
gree of scepticism. However, a few well-known jurists such as Ibn
Taymiyyah and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, rejected this distinc-
tion between shahhdah and riwkynh altogether (Fadel, 7997: L97).
Al-Jawziyyah emphatically stated that the transmission of a Pro-
phetic report required the greatest test of stringency with regard
to precautions in discourse. Moreover, a slave's transmission of a
Prophetic report, if accepted, is ample justification for permitting
a slave's testimony into a courtroom. The implications of this ar-
gument by al-lawziyyah extends to women's testimony and Ibn
al-Qayyim employed these implications to argue that if a woman
was regarded as being reliable in her testimony in financial mai-
ters, then she must also be regarded as reliable in all other walks
of life (Fadel, 1997:797). Second, ibn al-Qayyim and Ibn Taymiyyah
extrapolated from the preceding, arguments: that a judge should
be permitted to rule on the testimony of men or women based on
the likelihood of that evidence being true (Fadel, 7997:797). On this
basis both jurists rejected the foundational normative-political dis-
tinction used to justify discrimination on the basis of gender.
In order to base this argument in the primary sources, Ibn
Taymiyyah comments on Q II: 282 by pointing out that the re-
quirement of plurality of witnesses in the, Qur'An is for recording
purposes. If a woman is "intelligent and remembers and is trust-
worthy in her religion" then her testimony is like that of the trans-
mission of a religious text (Fadel, 7997: 1'97).In addition, Ibn
Taymiyyah points out that the verse is not directed toward judg-
es, but, rather, toward individuals who are involved in an indi-
vidual transaction thereby making the relevance of verse to the
courtroom fairly oblique (Fadel, 7997: 797). The actual meaning of
the verse would be to use two male witnesses or, in their absence,
with one male and two female witnesses (Fadel, 1997: 798).It is
important to point out at this juncture that no school of Islamic
law ever restricted the use of combinations of witnesses accord-
ing to the nature of the matter before the court (Fadel, 7997:198).
To highlight the axiom behind such a practice, Ibn Taymiyyah states
that the requirement to ask two women to testify at the time of
recording the testimony does not necessarily mean that judgement
cannot be rendered with a lesser number of witnesses. He con-
Studia Islamika, VoL 10, No. 1, 2003
Fiqh, Women and Human Rights 145
cludes his argument by stating that the admissibility of testimony
should not be determined on the basis of gender, but rather, on
the basis of the credibility of the witness (Fade, L997: 798).
It is this rich source of contradictions, differing sociological views
and the rigor of Ibn Taymiyya's juristic reasoning that provides a
fiqh-based authority to rectify the gender discrimination in the area
of the probative value of a woman's testimony. Rather than simply
state that sex stereotyping is the cause of much of the legal discrim-
ination against Muslim women (as does Mayer), writers should fol-
Iow the example and approach of Fadel who has succeeded in pre-
senting a far more practical and helpful legal armoury for Purposes
of law reform. Not only does Fadel's analysis provide an authorita-
tive fiqh (Ibn Taymiyyah) to present a modern-day interpretation
of both primary and secondary legal sources regarding women's
testimony, but the jurisprudence reveals that the normative-politi-
cal division allowed women (in Sunni schools) to be muflis. It is at
this point, after presenting the capability of usil al-fiqh to yields
favourable interpretations of the primary and secondary sources of
law, that the question of legal methodology becomes ali the more
pertinent. This urgency is informed by the need to more coherently
and systematically provide a structure within which to clearly artic-
ulate modern readings of the original sources. It is to the possibility
of such a task that the paper now turns.
The Methodologies of Rahman and Shahrur
At this juncture, it is possible to draw two conclusions regard-
ing the premodern juristic heritage and modern attempts at Is-
lamic law reform. First, the reasons for the narrow literalist ap-
proach to the law and the processes of deriving the law pertain
both to mundane requirements of medieval state administration,
to an Ash'arites3 theological postulate and to modern history of
colonial resistance. With regard to the first temporal exigency it is
important point out that the medieval legal establishment was
obliged to develop an internal system regulating the giving ifth.A
Thus, the reiteration within the four schools of the necessity for
an authoritative hierarchy of sources had the effect of preventing
jurists from departing from the legal doctrines as stated in the
sources.ss Without such a hierarchy the administration of law would
have been impossible.5s
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The second aspect which emerges from previous sections re-
garding the premodern heritage and modern attempts at law re-
form, is that even if such reform is approached through a fiqh-
based foundation, the methods by which reformers such as Ab-
duh and Rida derive their reforms display a dangerously inade,
quate structure. The inadequacy of the legal reasoning in this sit-
uation can best be illustrated by the use of talfiq.s7 quas-ijtihkd,s8
and mnslahaftse which produced an amalgamation of doctrine that
is unsustainable precisely for its lack of consistency of underlying
rationale. The danger that arises in this qd-hoc approach to law
reform is that by mixing legal doctrines, the reasoning embedded
at the core of various rulings is often contradictory. This results
in the lack of a consistent underlying legal rationale in each at-
tempt at law reform. Put simply, inconsistent legal reasoning is
the result of an arbitrary methodology.
What do the preceding two points means in terms of articulat-
ing new and coherent Islamic legal methodology? Perhaps more
than anything else they highlight the need for a way in which to
formulate legal principles and tools or extracting such principles,
that reflect the ethical postulates of the primary sources of t'iqh.
The first examples of such an attempt to present a legal methodol-
ogy is that presented by Fazlur Rahman.
Rahman's "Double Movement Theory"
The way in which Rahman approaches the concept of method-
ology hinges upon the connection he makes between the revealed
text and the broad intention and spirit behind the specific lan-
guage of the text.60 The main thrust of this argument is that rather
than interpreting the primary legai sources on a verse by verse6l
basis, the Qur'An must be analysed as a unity against the back-
drop of Meccan and Medinian society.62 A thorough knowledge of
Arabian customs, society and economics is required for this task.
Rahman illustrates how his method of interpreting the Qur'An ap-
plies to the apparently conflicting verses pertaining to the con-
sumption of alcohol. There are three verses, which relate to alco-
hol consumption. The first mentions alcohol as being part of God's
bounty along with milk and honey (Qur'An 76:66-69). A later verse
then qualifies the initial verse by stating that alcohol is both bene-
ficial and detrimentai with the latter quality outweighing the
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former (Qur'An 2: 279). Still, Iater, when a group of Ansar in Me-
dina became inebriated and misread the Qur'An, the verse (Qur'an
4:43) was revealed which unequivocally stated that alcohol should
not be consumed so that it would interfere with prayer. Finally,
after a severe disturbance broke out amongst a group of inebriat-
ed Muslims in Medina, a fourth verse (Qur'6n 5: 90-97) was re-
vealed, exhorting believers to desist from drinking because it was
the cause of discord and strife between members of one commu-
nity. The traditional jurists rationalised the apparent contradic-
tion of verses by resorting to the principle of naskh or of "gradua-
tion".63 Rahman, however, proposes to extract a legal principle from
the seemingly contradictory set of verses by looking at the socio-
logical and historical reasons for their revelation. The reason be-
hind the verses is that when humans gather into societies, often
the social effect of alcohol consumption is detrimental.6a This is
the general principle or rationale behind the series of verses. A
failure to elicit general principles results in precisely the fragment-
ed nature of the traditional jurists reasoning and rulings.6s
How does Rahman's system of eliciting general principles from
the primary sources apply to the law pertaining to Muslim wom-
en? With regard to the verses relating to polygamy, Rahman points
out that the rulings are, at first glance, contradictory. In 4: 2 the
Qur'An warns against the uniawful use of orphan's property with
whom they are entrusted. Then, in 4:726 the Qur'An states that the
guardian are permitted to marry up to four of the orphaned girls
when they come of age if they (the guardian) fear they may be
unable to safeguard the properties. This permission is given pro-
vided the guardians can be just io all the wives. If they cannot be
just, then they marry only one (Qur'An 4: 3). However,4'.127 stip-
ulates that it is impossible to do justice among a plurality of wives.
Rahman points out that what many jurists and Islamists forget, is
that the verses were revealed in the context of orphaned girls.
Instead of confining the interpretation of the verse to this situa-
tional context, jurists deemed the permission to marry up to four
wives as beings legally sanctioned, whereas the requirement of
justice between wives was left to individual consience of the hus-
band. By so doing, Rahman shows how the general principle be-
hind the verses relating to justice was taken to be a mere recom-
mendation, and the situational verse to be a universal, legally val-
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id rule.la3 Rahman further argues that the verce relating to justice
should take precedence over the ones sanctioning polygamous
marriage because of the recurring theme of justice in the Qur'An
(Rahman, 7997:244).
What Rahman propose to do therefore, is to elicit general prin-
ciples from specific rulings through the interpretative lens of the
sociological forces that produced those rulings. The potential prob-
lem of this approach however, is that it is too open to charges of
subjectivity. In particular, it is the second movement of the theo-
ry-the one proceeding from the general principle to the modern
context-which requires a more precise criteria to be applied to it.
Such criteria would address the crucial question of which general
principles to accept or reject (Rahman, 7997:245). What is required
of Rahman's methodology in this respect, is a precise mechanism
by which to apply the systematic principles derived from the re-
vealed texts and their context in a modern milieu. An additional
drawback of Rahman's approach is that he presents his methodol-
ogy using only a few examples. It is therefore uncertain whether
his theory of eliciting general principles could be used for every
verse or hadith (Rahman, 7997: 245).It is precisely this uncertain
and vague part of legal methodology that the Syrian reformer,
Muhammad Shahrur addresses.
Muhammad Shahrur "Theory of Limits"
Shahrur's recent work (7992)66 presents a remarkable and inno-
vative6T system of iegal methodology that has the potential to ad-
equately address the Islamic law as it pertains to women. Shahrur
uses a conceptual matrix from the areas of mathematics and phys-
ics to put forward a "Theory of Limits". First, on the basis of Qur'An
15:9, he legitimately arrogates to the present generation of Mus-
lims the right to interpret the primary sources an the light modern
conditions.6s By pointing out that the Qur'An promises to "pre-
serve" its own text, it is as much the property of later generations
as that of earlier generations. As such, we are entitled to interpret
the primary sources in a manner that responds to the exigencies of
our age.6e Shahrur takes his analysis one step further by viewing
the issue of "Remembrance" in a teleological manner. According
to this perspective, Shahrur maintains that modern Muslims are
better equipped to understand the meaning of the revelation as
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the Qur'An speaks of people who have a "higher" level of culture
as being better equipped to comprehend the revealed texts.70 There-
fore, since twentieth century Muslims are possessed of a "higher"
cul(ure and scientific knowledge, they are better qualified to en-
gage in interpretation of the primary legal sources than their clas-
sical and medieval predecessors.
Intersected with this clever argument regarding jurisdiction
over the right to interpret the Qur'An and Sunnah, is a crucial dis-
tinction made between "the Qur'An" and "the Book"' This distinc-
tion, Shahrur explains, arises from the separate functions of the
Muhammad. as a Messenger (RnsfiI) and as Prophet (Nabi). The lat-
ter title made the Prophet the recipient of information dealing with
prophecy and religious matters whereas the former gave to him a
bulk of legal instructions in nddition fo the Prophetic information
(Shahrur, 7997 : 246-7). Furthermore, Shahrur characterises the func-
tion of the Prophet as being religious, whereas that of the Messen-
ger is legal. Following from this distinction, Shahrur states that
prophetic information (the Qur'An) is textually ambiguous and is
hence capable of various interpretations' At the same time, the
Iegal subject matter is clear although it can be subject to iitihhd.
Ijilhad in this context, is distinguished from interpretation by point-
ing out that ijtihkd is a process by which legal language is made to
yield a particular effect according to different historical contexts
(Shahrur, 1997:247).
It is it at this point that shahrur introduces scientific concepts
in order to elucidate the legal Message. Here he explains that the
Qur'An contains the two attributes of straightness (istiqhmqh) and
curvature (hanifiyyah) that correspond to qualities that exist in the
natural world. He does this by listing various verses in the Qur'An
where these two terms occur (Shahtur,l'997'.247). The nature of
both terms is that of a symbiotic relationship. shahrur illustrates
this relationship by showing how all motion in the natural world,
from an electron to the movement of star systems and galaxies,
conforms to a non-linear pattern. Similarly, curvature in law rep-
resents itself as the change and evolution societies experience
through time and space. So as to order the curvature that exists in
a changing society, the principle of "straightness" becomes a means
bywhich society regulates and harmonises the curvature.Tl Whereas
curvature exists in the natural world, straightness must be intro-
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duced by divine revelation so as to co-exist with curvature in the
ordering of human societies (Shahrur, 1997 427). Shahrur rein-
forces this part of "his argument by quoting 1: 5 where humans
are shown to as for guidance regarding the-straight path.
The picture that emerges then of the attributes of straightness
and curvature is that both exist in a dialectical-relationshin that
allows for law to adapt to different times and places. This simul-
taneous intersection of straightness and curvature is the basis for
Shahrur's "Theory of Limits", According to this theory, humans
may move in a curaed manner within the straight lines of the The-
ory of Limits (Shahrur, 1997:248).
More precisely, the Theory of Limits represents the divine
message as expressed in the Qur'An and Sunna, which sets a Low-
er and Upper Limit for all human actions. Nothing short of the
minimum is legally permitted and nothing above the Uppers Limitis
deemed lawful (Shahrur, 7997:248). Shahrur presents six kinds of
Limits the details of which are too complex to describe here. How-
ever, his Theory of Limits as it applies to the issue of polygamy
will be detailed as it relates to the central aims of ihis paper. Be-
fore embarking on the application of his Theory to polygamy,
Shahrur is careful to expose the erroneous epistemological pre-
mises of the early jurists. First, he says that the jurists faiied to
distinguish between the primary sources that express the Limits
of God and these that are mereiy instructions. Secondly, jurists
have failed to view the Qur'Anic and Sunnic ruiings on women asjust the beginning of the gradual process of emancipation. The
liberation of women was therefore meant to continue after the
death of the Prophet rather than to be frozen in time (Shahrur,
7997:250). As to the Theory of Limits, Shahrur states that the tra-
ditional interpretation regarding the polygamy verses has been
that the Lower Limit is to marry one wife and the Upper Limit is
four wives. However, what the Jurists have failed to realise is
that the verses have, a significant qualitative aspect. For example,
what sort of women are the verses alluding to? The verse makes it
clear that its main focus are orphans (yatkmh)7z and the next verse
then refers to "women" thus; "rrrarry of the women". Here Shahr-
ur infers the women alluded to here are the widowed mothers of
the orphans. Therefore to allowed marriage of up to a fourth wife
is a permission that pertains to the legal means by which protec-
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tion can be extended to orphaned children (Shahrur,1997:252).
The importance of this, humane act is highlighted by the repeated
Qur'Anic and Sunnic exhortations relating to the protection and
care of orphans. The main thrust of the verses is therefore direct-
ed not at women, but at the protection of orphans.
What unfolds from the discussion of Rahman and Shahrur's
methodologies is the nascent foundations of a clearer structure
from within which to articulate a more sophisticated and progres-
sive discourse for Muslim women's human rights. Although both
examples are not without their respective flaws, they stand as more
precise and holistic conceptual structures from which to launch
coherent legal reform for women living under Islamic systems of
law. More importantly, they systematically deal with the histori-
cal and legal heritage of fiqh without which any discussion in this
area of legal reform is dangerously lacking in both authority and
substance.
Conclusion: Towards a New Methodology of
Islamic Law and Human Rights
The purpose of the preceding discussion and critique of the
current academic debate about Muslim women and human rights
is to point out that practical and inclusive academic strategies need
to be urgentiy devised and employed if any meaningful progress
is to be made. Understanding the fundamental and crucial link
between theory and practice, scholars and academics need to re-
think the very foundations of the discourse of human rights and
Islam. Such a reconceptualisation entails a critical awareness of
Orientalism. More precisely, each individual scholar must be alert-
ed to the interstices of knowledge and power that are part of the
process of representation of Islam. Cultivating such an awareness
will have the effect of allowing for a more nuanced approach-
one that explores and makes constructive use of the rich and con-
tested site of Islamic jurisprudence, the Arabic language, Islamic
history as well as the terminology of human rights.
It is very eaqy to simply attack a way of life and a system of
law as being androcentric and inimical to women's human rights.
The ease with which such an attack can be launched is demon-
strated by Maver's comparative study which, at its culmination,
provides no practical legal solutions to very real everyday human
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rights abuses. Moreover, Mayer proposes to write a tome about
Islam and Human rights in which only a fraction is devoted to
exploring the sources, nature and scope of over fourteen hundred
years of highty complex jurisprudence.T3 Rather, Mayer (inadvert-
ently) causes the scope of the debate to be narrowed and further
polarised by omitting this crucial foundation to the current legal
human rights situation. Anwar and Wadud, although re-Iocating
the debate within the Islamic tradition, fail to adequately deal
with the question of fiqh precisely for the same reason: the lqck of
a coherent approach and an inability to systematically engage with
the juristic heritage of fiqh.
More importantly, Muslim women are fighting two battles, one
stemming from internal patriarchal pressures and the other emit-
ted by forces that are seen to be threatening people's national-
cultural boundaries. Often, close association or identification with
Western images and discourses may jeopardise the effectiveness
of Muslim women's internal legal struggles.Ta Without a new ap-
proach, Muslim women engaged in the very real (and often dan-
gerous) struggles for human rights will continue to be caught be-
tween "betrayal and betrayal" .7s It has been the aim of this paper
to submit that a more practical and adequate approach is one that
actively and critically engages with the Islamic legal sources and
tools and acknowledges the legacy of legal Orientalism. Such an
approach must be simultaneously conjoined with a broader task
of reformulating an internally coherent legal methodology. The
history of European dominance over most of the Islamic world,
the resistance movements that grew out of coloniai occupation and
the current Islamist resurgence, all require such a revised meth-
odoiogy. It is hoped that this paper will point the way to more
inclusive, sensitive and coherent method for approaching Islamic
law, human rights and women in the future.
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Endnotes
1. The UDHR of 1,948 forms part of the International Bili of Human Rights. It
includes the International Covenant on Economic, Sociai And Cultural Rights
(ICESCR), of 7966 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) also of 1966.
2. Shai'ah is the "whole duty of mankind" encompassing all aspects of public
and private law. See Vesey-Fitzgerald, (1955: 85). For a more detailed anal-
ysis of the development of the concep t of shafi' ah see Rahman (7979 : 107-9).
For a shorter exposition see Schacht (1964: 7) . Alternatively, for a detailed
discussion see, Hallaq (1994); Aziz al-Azmeh (1988); Heer (1990).
3. "Islamist" in ihis context is a term meant to describe various movements
which urge the (selective) reinstitution of laws and practices set forth in the
core Isiamic legal discourses. Examples of Islamist individuals and groups
will be mentioned subsequently.
4. Badran (7995:23); for a more detailed discussion of the effect of the colonial
feminist legacy in the Muslim World see Ahmed (1992: 244). lHereafter
cited as Women and Gender in Islaml. A more recent analysis can be found in
Haddad and Esposito 0998); Walther (7993:227-260).
5. The literature on usttl alJiqh is vast. A preliminary explanation is given by
Schacht ('1964:58-68). The nuances in its meaning are explored by Makdisi
(1984:5-47).
6. The attempt by Abduh and Rida to reform Islamic law using a quasi-ijtihad
under the rubric of "public welfare" will be detailed later in section II and
III of the paper. For a detailed analysis see Kerr (1966:1'03-"186). Also see
Adams (1968). For an example of an imprecise attempt at legal reform in
this area see Esposito (1982: 103-135).
7. The literature detailing and explaining the highly complex sources and
tools of Islamic jurisprudence are too numerous to adumbrate in paper as
short as this. These sources have been studied and debated for many de-
cades and a starting point for surveying the literature is Coulson (1964);
Schacht (1.964) and (1950); Kamali (1989). For a refutation of Schacht's the-
sis; also see al-Azami (1985). For a very comprehensive overview of the
Iegal sources from a lawyer's perspective that is also an Islamic scholar, see
Mahmassani (1961).
8. Khan(1971:ix-xiii).
9. Stowasser (1984: 1 1). For studies dealing with the text of the Qur'An and its
interpretation see Wansborough (1.977).
10. See Powers (1985). Also see Juynboll (1969) and (1983).
11. Known individually as hadith (phral ahkdith).
1.2. For an excellent description of ijmfr' see Hallaq (1'997: 75-81).
1.3. 'Mujtahid'is the description given to one who exercises ijtihhd (independent
reasoning) in uncovering the terms of God's law. See Hallaq (1.997:1'77) fot
a succint explanation.
14. See note 8 for basic introductions of qiyils.
15. "Taqlid" means "imitation". See Schacht (7964:69).
16. There has been considerable academic debate about the aPParent "closing
of the gate of ijtihad". Perhaps the best recent work in this area has been
undertaken by Hallaq (1.984).
1,7.See Hallaq (1.997:220-222),Ior a historical discussion of istihshn.
18.Ibid.
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L9. This is the oft'icial English translation of the lranian Constitution.
20. MaulAnA Abfr al-A'lA Mawdrldi's major writings are an excellent example of
reactive Islamist positions on women, law and human rights. See, for ex-





25. Said (7978:1,). According to Said, "Orientalism is a way of coming to terms
with the Orient that is Based on Orient's special place in European Western
Experience".
26. Ibid (3). Also see Said's comments about this misuse and misunderstandins
of his critique of Orientalism in Said (1.997).
Also Osbourn e (7996: 76-78). For a detailed examination of the process
of Orientalist representation see Said (1987); for a more controversial ex-
amination of Said's legacy see Abaza and Stauth (1988: especially pp 352-
353). For a more expansive illustration of Orientalism see Said (i993). The
way in which Islamic law is viewed in the European imagination is exam-
ined by al-Azmeh (1993: 161-180).
27. Ayatollah Javad Banohar was briefly Iran's prime minister before being
assassinated. He was also a close aide of Ayatollah Khomeini. Mayer dis-
sects his work "Islam and Women's Rights" (1984: 160).
28. Anouar Majid has undertaken an incisive criiique of Mayer from an Islamic
and Marxist perspective. Majid (1998: 321-356).
29. Sisters in Islam (SIS) is a group of professional Malaysian Muslim women
formed in the mid 1980's which was established to draw government at-
tention to the impiementation of the Islamic Famiiy Laws in 1988. Since
that time, SIS members have written extensively on issues relating to Mus-
lim women, state nationalism, the role of civil society and human rights.
For example see Othman (1.994) and Ismail (1995).
30. Anwar (1998). [Hereafter cited as "The Struggle for Women's Rights"].
Wadud (7998).
31. For the way in which Malaysian adat t.as interacted with Islamist law see
Hooker (1970). For a very detailed description of the complexity of this
Iegal interaction and its social consequences, see Karim (7992).
32. To be discussed at the end of the section.
33. Anwar displays a lack of knowledge about the role of muftis and their
historical relationship with state authority. A closer historical examination
reveals that there were varying levels of political interactions between
muftis and those in authority. See Masud, Messick and Powers (1996:3-4).
34. DAr aI-IsMm and dAr al-harb are politico-legal concepts devised to describe
the temporal location of the Islamic Empire and the "realm of unbeliev-
ers". Its precise parameters are too complex to be dealt with in this paper.
See Khadduri (1955). AIso Lambton (1981). For a more modern analysis,
see Piscatori (1986).
35. c/f Fazlur Rahman's "Double Theory Movement" in Section III.
36. For a description of the roie of the'ulamh' in classical and medieval Isiamic
society, see Hallaq (1997: 153-161).
37. Wadud (1998: 1). A similar argument which employs very effective Isiamic
conceptual tools has been written by Barazangi (1996:79-85)
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38. Wadud (.1998).
39. kid.
40. Ibid(10)."Ma'ritt'" and"Munkar" referstotheenjoiningof whatisrightand
the forbidding of what is wrong.
41. Hosseini (7996:285); [Hereafter cited as "stretching the Limits,,]. Fadel(7997).
42. Hosseini 0996:285)
43. For an introduction to shiah jurisprudence, see schacht (1950); also, Fyzee(1955: 115). For a more modern anaiysis of Shi,i jurisprudence see Calder(7996).
44, Motahhari (1981).
45. Shariati (7978), also (1,979)
46. Hosseini 0.996: 290).
47 . This is the divorce is initiated by the husba nd, ibid (292) 
.
48. This is very similar to Fazlur Rahman's methodology, which will be out-
lined in the next section.
49. See also, Ahmed (7992); Mernissi (7987:75 and 126).
50. Qur'An 2: 283
51. Fadel (1997 788), see note 46 for a more detailed discussion of the regula-
tion of normative discourse.
52. see Mernissi (7997) for a historical and modern sociolosical discussion of
fitnah in Islamic societies.
53. TheconflictbetweentheMu'tazilahandtheAsh'aritesisdiscussedinHoura-
ni (1971.); Also, Khadduri (1984: 78-105). For a far more analytical exposi-
tion which describes how the Ash'arite worid-view came to dominate the
interpretation of revelation, see Fakhry (1991). Any discussion of this de-
velopment in Islamic legal history must deal with the issue of freedom,
humanism and individualism in the Muslim tradition. These issues are be-
yond the scope of this paper. As an introduction see, Kraemer (7992);
Rosenthal (1960); Coulson (1957); Makdisi (1990). For a modern exnosition
see, Monshipouri (1998).
54. The way to achieve such regulation was to recognise a set of canonical
works within each school of law, without knowledge of which a person's
f atwA was deemed inadmissible by a court. Hallaq (1997: 209).
55. Coulson (1996: 4$.
56. Hallaq (7997:209).
57. "Talfiq" is where a part of a doctrine of one school is combined with part
from another. For example the Ottoman Law of Famiiy Rights (1917). See
Flaliaq (7997:210).
58. This is an ijtihad that does not conform to the strict rules regarding the
authoritative hierarchy of legal sources as stated in the four schools of law.
See Hallaq (1997: 270-277).
59. "Maslahah" is the doctrine of "public interest" which was used by Abduh in
a fairly utilitarian manner; See Kerr (1.966).
60. Rahman (1965); Also see (1,979). Another excellent example of Rahman,s
argument and methods can be found in (979:223). The most thorough
overview can be found in (1982) and (1980).
61. Or in the case of the Sunnah. a report by report basis.
62. Rahman (7986:45)
63. The centrality of the doctrine of naskh in the interpretation of Qur'Anic
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verses is too vast to be dealt with here. For an excellent aPPraisal see Hallaq
(1997: 83-101).
64. Rahman (7986:47).
65. For the ethical implications of such fragmentation see Rahman (1985: 3-5).
66. No translation of this book in English exists, so I am relying on Hallaq's
exposition of Shahrur's thesis in (7997:245-254)'
67. Thls is not to detract from the fact that Shahrur's book is not accepted by
the orthodoxy as it employs some quite radical terminology that often
cannot be expiicitly rooted in primary sources. Nevertheless, it is present-
ed here as an example of how the spirit of the Qur'An can be harnessed in
a systematic way for the purposes of law reform.
68. "Indeed, We have revealed the Remembrance, and lo, we verily are its
Preservers".
69. Shahrur 0997:246).
70. This reading of the Qur'an emerges from 9: 97 where the Bedouins are said
to have been "more hard in disbelief and hypocrisy" than other Arabs who
possessed a higher level of culture, and were therefore likely "to be igno-
iant of the limits God revealed to his Messenger, Shahrur (1997.240)'
77.For an excellent description of this process, see Bohm (1980).
72. Shahrur, with the help of an Arabic linguistJa'afar Daqq al-Bab, establishes
that the meaning of yafim| refers to children with no father. Al-Bab's com-
plex linguistic arguments are beyond the scope of this essay. For a succrnct
expostion see Fakhro (1996:253) where she applies Shahrur's thesis to the
issue of legal re{orm in the Gulf. The centrality of ianguage and legal sci-
ence 'in Islam is discussed by Weiss (1984: 15-21).
73. For an Excellent and incisive critique of Western feminists' approach in the
area of human rights, see Kishwar, (1996: 30)
74. Tohidi, ('998:283)
75. The term is taken from Bennoune's, (1995: 51)
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